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Indigenous Peoples’ and Other Stakeholder Reaction to an Unacceptable Proposed Corporate
Investment: The Northern Gateway Oil Pipeline Project
Abstract
The economic consequences of a First Nations response to Enbridge and the voicing of concerns over
the violation of human rights resulting from the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline are examined.
Despite overwhelming opposition and contrary to indigenous rights, the proposed pipeline was to cross
more than 50 territories claimed by First Nations. The pipeline would transverse through unique
ecosystems that are home to endangered species, and tankers would travel through one of the largest
undeveloped temperate rainforests in the world. Given Enbridge’s history with oil spills and
environmental violations, potential future oil spills are a serious concern. Because of these concerns,
stakeholders have engaged in historical displays of activism. This study examines the unprecedented
termination of this project given pressure from Enbridge’s stakeholders and, in particular, the Indigenous
peoples involved. The economic consequences of stakeholder activism events during a seven-year
period are analyzed for abnormal stock returns (AAR) around announcement dates using the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model. The results indicate that the market reacts negatively to human
rights violation risk and environmental risk. The study provides evidence that the market factors these
risks into its investment decisions, providing the impetus for accounting standard setters to mandate
human rights violation and environmental risk disclosures. Furthermore, this study contributes to the
evolving and emerging global business norms, regulatory requirements, and worldwide accounting
reporting standards in terms of disclosing and accounting for indigenous rights violations and
environmental risk.
Keywords: Indigenous Rights Violation Risk; Environmental Risk; First Nations; Business and
Human Rights; Economic Consequences, Stakeholder Activism, Environmental Accounting;
Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting, Oil Industry, Resource Extraction, Business Ethics
JEL Classification: F53, G14, G18, K33, M14, M41, M42, M48, Q34, Q56, Q57, Y100
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Indigenous Peoples’ and Other Stakeholder Reaction to an Unacceptable Proposed Corporate
Investment: The Northern Gateway Oil Pipeline Project
1. INTRODUCTION
Enbridge, the world’s largest pipeline operator, has proposed the construction of a 1,170kilometer pipeline stretching from the Alberta tar sands to the Kitimat marine terminal in British
Columbia. This pipeline proposal, which won the backing of the previous Conservative Canadian
federal government in 2013, is estimated to be worth $98 billion in total (federal and provincial) tax
revenue collections and $70 billion in Canadian labor income per year (Joint Review Panel 18,
December 2013). The United Nations (UN) Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises observes that, “States feel compelled to
satisfy the requirements of big business at the expense of human rights and environmental obligations.
Most commonly, there can be a lack of political will or capacity of States to respect their own human
rights and environmental law obligations towards indigenous populations, given what is perceived to
be at stake including but not limited to interest and potential income from foreign investors, potential
economic benefits (either conspicuous or inconspicuous) and development of the country (at the
expense of a few)” (7 August 2013, pg. 2, section A 7.).
However, this pipeline proposal was greeted with strident opposition from numerous groups,
most importantly the First Nations Indigenous peoples whose land the pipeline would affect. Most of
the First Nations peoples are opposed to the project proceeding. They assert that Canada and Enbridge
have failed to acknowledge their right to make decisions about their lands and resources, and that the
project is in direct violation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
(UNDRIP) and contrary to internationally accepted business practices (Gilbert, 2013). Similarly,
numerous environmental groups have shown strong opposition to the project. Further, Enbridge
stockholders appear to believe that the numerous risks surrounding the project make it worth less than
it will cost. Additionally, the most recently elected liberal Canadian government has shown little
support for the project. As of May 2017, there is absolutely no indication that this pipeline project will
happen. Thus, the Northern Gateway pipeline represents a pointed example of stakeholder activism
acting effectively to halt a huge investment project.
We examine the proposed pipeline project and how Enbridge’s approach to making the project
happen has failed. We also examine the efforts of the First Nations peoples, environmental groups,
Enbridge stockholders, and other stakeholders who have prevented the project from happening. Our
2
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study provides market-based evidence on how public opposition and stakeholder activism can
significantly affect a company’s stock price and ultimately halt a very large-scale project.
Canada had 2012 energy exports totaling $110 billion and its oil resources are estimated to be the
third largest in the world. As previously noted, the total projected federal and provincial tax revenues
and Canadian labor income attributable to the Enbridge pipeline have been estimated at $168 billion
per year. Clearly, then, the ruling government has its own self-interests involved in either supporting
the Northern Gateway or choosing not to do so at the expense of not being able to recognize the tax
benefits of the pipeline happening.
At the same time, the importance of the First Nations to Canada’s economy and identity cannot
be over-emphasized. The First Nations are estimated to contribute $32 billion by 2016 through 36,000
businesses and governments. The importance of these people suggests that their concerns about the
hazards of the pipeline should be paramount to the relevant governmental and corporate entities and,
thus, be recognized and generate a response. The primary concerns with the pipeline are, first, that it
faces geo-hazards, such as avalanches, earthquakes, deep snow, and heavy rains (National Energy
Board, 2013). Second, the pipeline will affect numerous at-risk species and will cross at least 650
salmon spawning rivers. Additionally, concerns exist over how construction and maintenance
activities will affect wildlife, rare plants, sensitive ecosystems, soils, wetlands, fish, amphibians, birds,
old-growth forests, and surface and groundwater resources. Third, Enbridge has not received free and
prior informed consent (FPIC) from the First Nations to conduct any type of operations on these lands.
In doing so, Enbridge has violated First Nations’ legal rights to both engagement and consultation.
In addition to the First Nations opposition to the Northern Gateway project, remarkably, Enbridge
shareholders have expressed their opposition to this project on several levels. They are concerned with
the firm facing material business risk, including litigation risk, operational delays, political risk,
reputational risk, financial risk, and environmental risk. The sentiment is that management has not
specifically accounted for these risks in a proper manner.
Using a regression-based model (Fama and French, 1993) and cumulative abnormal excess
returns (CAARs) from the announcement day period, significant economic consequences (assessed
using CAAR tests for market reaction) from all of these events are examined through the impact on
Enbridge’s share price. We find that the market reacts with a significant negative response to First
Nations’ announcements regarding violations of their rights attributable to the Enbridge project.
Further, the market reacts negatively to both the First Nations’ and environmental activism events that
are a response to Enbridge’s actions. Thus, Enbridge suffers material economic consequences for these
3
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perceived violations. Conversely, announcements by Enbridge generate no significant positive or
negative response, suggesting that its positive announcements do not generate “good news” and its
negative announcements are not a surprise. Yet, the negative impacts of the First Nations and
environmentalist activism that we find on Enbridge’s stock price are not observed on the market prices
of Enbridge’s business partners.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the public opposition to the Northern Gateway project by
the First Nations, public support groups, environmental groups, and governmental units shows strong
support for the parties opposed to the project. We offer evidence on the question of “what matters
most to stockholders.” Is their priority “profits at any cost” (economic insatiability) or responsible
concern for the firm’s stockholders and other stakeholders regarding the protection of indigenous
rights and the environment (stakeholder activism)? We conclude that investors do indeed factor
indigenous rights and environmental concerns into their investment decisions at the expense of current
profits, or perhaps by taking into account future profits.
The results suggest several points for the accounting industry going forward. First, the expected
costs and potential liability of indigenous rights violation risk and environmental risk are not currently
stated in financial reports in a transparent manner. Thus, investors are extremely vulnerable to the
associated costs that a business may incur if making such an investment. Thereby, stakeholders are
entitled to have these risks reported on audited financial statements and corporate social responsibility
reports. Second, U.S. regulators are paving the way by mandating stock listing requirements that
address human rights via Dodd–Frank 1504. Additionally, the Global Reporting Initiative, the world’s
most widely used sustainability-reporting framework, includes a reporting standard requiring business
to disclose the number of indigenous rights violations and actions taken. Third, our findings are timely
because the natural resource industry and the First Nations in Canada estimate resource projects from
the First Nations in the near future to be worth more than $600 billion (Daly, 2013). In sum, we
conclude that accounting standards must change to reflect, and account for, indigenous rights and the
potential costs to firms. If properly done, the benefits will accrue to all stakeholders and not just the
stockholders—or the firm.
This research is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Canadian setting, Enbridge, and
previous research work, and addresses this paper’s relation to these subjects. Section 3 describes the
data and research methods employed. Section 4 describes the research findings. Section 5 summarizes
our findings and makes conclusions.
2. CANADIAN SETTING AND LITERATURE REVIEW
4
Published by Digital Commons @ Southern University and A&M College,

5

Southern University College of Business E-Journal, Vol. 12 [], Iss. 3, Art. 1

A. The Importance of Oil to Canada
Canada is rich in energy resources, and energy represents 25% of its total exports (Eyford,
2013). Energy exports are an important component of the economy, and totaled $110 billion in 2012
or approximately 6% of Canada’s total gross domestic product (GDP) (National Energy Board, 2012).
Canada is the sixth largest oil producer with the third largest petroleum reserve in the world, and oil
production contributed $17.2 billion in capital spending and $18 billion in royalty and tax revenue in
2012 alone (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2013). Given current economic policies,
Canada depends on oil for both job creation and economic growth. Canada has set its sights on
diversifying its energy commodities to meet this demand because the global demand for oil by
developing countries is expected to grow. Media outlets citing CIBC economist reports warned that
Canada is losing as much as $50 million to $100 million a day because it is forced to sell its oil at a
discount to its sole customer, the United States (Financial Post, 3 April, 2013). However, economist
Robyn Allan (2013) refuted this amount, suggesting that the loss is exaggerated because of double
counting. Regardless, the United States has plans in place to be self-sufficient in the near future.
Ethical opposition also exists to the oil sands development and its effect on climate change,
making Canada’s reliance on the United States even more perilous. Consequently, Canada needs
access to new markets to receive world value for its crude, and China is eager to become Canada’s
primary customer. The projected economic benefits of diversifying are staggering to both the oil
industry and the Canadian economy. Diversification would trigger billions of dollars in annual revenue
increases for oil producers, translating into increased capital spending, tax revenues, and royalties. As
a result, Canada has set the stage to build infrastructure to support the diversification of its energy
resources to Asia. Given that the majority of the proposed projects related to energy affect the First
Nations’ rights to their land and resources; they have emerged as one of the most important
stakeholders in the energy sector.

B. First Nations and Their Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent
As previously described, the First Nations peoples have a tremendous impact on Canada’s
economy, contributing $32 billion to GDP by 2016 across businesses and governments (Morriseau,
2013). Canada is at a historical juncture with respect to the advancement of oil, gas, mining, forestry,
and agriculture projects. Both domestic and international laws protect the First Nations basic human
right to make decisions about their land and resources. These rights, called Aboriginal Title, were
5
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protected in 1982 through the Canadian Constitution - Section 35 (Indigenous Foundations) and were
later defined in court through the Delgamuukw (1997), Taku River Tlingit (2004), and Haida Nation
(2004) decisions (Parliament of Canada, 1998; Judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada, 2004).
Further, the Constitution establishes that governments have a duty to consult and accommodate
Indigenous peoples regarding development impacts, and indigenous groups have the right to make
decisions about indigenous land and resources. The government can also require businesses to perform
certain aspects of consultation.
However, Aboriginal Title has never been proven in Canada’s courts. Instead, Canada has
attempted to negotiate treaties and interim contracts with respect to land and resource ownership, use,
and management. Most First Nations peoples will not cede their right to Aboriginal Title in exchange
for limited treaty benefits. This situation has created controversy in cases in which land and resource
assertions by the First Nations remain unsettled and businesses have been entitled to move forward,
with opposition from First Nations.
Barelli (2012) notes that “by virtue of their right to control natural resources for national
development goals, States claim that they can launch or authorize development projects on indigenous
lands without necessarily having to obtain the consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned.
Indigenous peoples, instead, maintain that their rights to self-determination and to own and control
ancestral lands entitle them to oppose any unwanted plan. Different instruments and bodies have
provided diverse answers to this difficult question, leaving the legal contours of FPIC rather nebulous”
(pg. 31).
Tugendhat, Couillard, Gilbert and Doyle (2009) state that large-scale industrial and economic
development has been undertaken without regard to or recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights. This
development has been mostly imposed from the outside and consultation with the Indigenous peoples
affected has been completely ignored. They further state that the coincident experience for Indigenous
people attributable to these extractive ventures have both diminished their standards of living and
eroded their rights. They cite a UN Centre for Transnational Corporations’ study that concludes that
the quality and quantity of Indigenous peoples’ participation in the decision-making process was the
chief determinate of multi-national firm performance regarding the respect shown for indigenous
rights. A similar declaration has been made by the UN Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (2013, pg. 9). Their affirmations state
that the parties involved will act in accordance with traditional cultural practices that protect and
encourage the customary use of biological resources. Further, national decision-making should
6
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integrate consideration of both conservation and sustainable use of biological resources.
Tugendhat et al. (2009, pg. 2) state that the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues is the preeminent body for addressing Indigenous peoples’ issues. This body “defines free, prior
and informed consent (FPIC) as a process undertaken free of coercion or manipulation, involving selfselected decision-making processes undertaken with sufficient time for effective choices to be
understood and made, with all relevant information provided and in an atmosphere of good faith and
trust.” They further note that the FPIC process must be both iterative and consultative. When the
process results in consent, a legally binding document should formalize the agreement. Conversely,
the company must withdraw its application when consent is withheld.
Canada endorsed the right to FPIC in 2010 when it became a signatory to the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP, 2007). The right to FPIC is codified
explicitly in international and domestic laws, and businesses and governments are obliged to obtain
FPIC for any project that may affect these rights. Countries such as the Philippines have incorporated
FPIC into domestic law (Tamang, 2005). Financial institutions require businesses to obtain FPIC to
qualify for financing through the equator principles. Investors have the ability to access information
about businesses’ commitments to FPIC through resources such as the Calvert Index and the Business
& Human Rights Resource Centre. Institutional investors have committed to the UN supported
principles for responsible investment to reflect the increasing relevance of issues such as indigenous
rights. The relevance of indigenous rights is without doubt an emerging global issue.
In the case of the Northern Gateway, most of the First Nations impacted by the pipeline are
opposed to the project proceeding. They assert that Canada and Enbridge have failed to acknowledge
their right to make decisions about their lands and their resources and that the Project is in direct
violation of the UNDRIP and contrary to internationally accepted business practices (Gilbert, 2013).
In contrast, Canada views the concept of consent as aspirational even though a recent court
decision favored an interpretation that would embody the values of the UNDRIP (Burchells, 2013).
Businesses often choose to follow Canada’s lead and refuse to prevent impacts to the Aboriginal Title
or obtain FPIC. They hide behind the assertion of “unresolved land claims” and use it to their benefit
to proceed with projects that the First Nations oppose. With more than two-thirds of the First Nations
in British Columbia falling into the category of unresolved land claims, a plethora of energy resources
contained within these lands, and businesses’ rush to reap economic benefits, a storm has been brewing
for decades (First Nations, 2013).
The Northern Gateway project brings this to the forefront and is one of the most controversial
7
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and politically divisive projects in recent history because the First Nations peoples are most likely
affected. “It is generally recognized that the most impoverished in our global community are
Indigenous peoples and local communities, who rely on the environment and ecosystems for their very
identities, cultures, livelihoods, and well-being. It follows then that damage to the environment most
acutely affects Indigenous peoples and local communities and their basic human rights” (UN Working
Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
2013, pg. 6).
C. Enbridge and the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project
The $7.9 billion Northern Gateway, a limited partnership formed in 2004, is a proposal by
Enbridge, the world’s largest pipeline construction company based in Calgary, Alberta. Enbridge
proposes to build the greatest infrastructure in Canada’s history to provide the means for Canadian oil
to access world oil markets. Enbridge and ten other energy companies have invested more than $450
million to develop the proposal. The economic benefits associated with the Northern Gateway include
a “$312 billion increase in Canadian gross domestic product, $44 billion in federal revenues, $54
billion to provincial or territorial governments, $70 billion in Canadian labor income, 907,000 person
years of employment over 30 years” (Joint Review Panel, 18 December, 2013).
The project involves the construction of two 1,178-kilometer side-by-side pipelines and a
marine terminal in Kitimat on the west coast of northern British Columbia. The pipelines will carry an
average of 525,000 barrels per day of bitumen west to Kitimat and an average of 193,000 barrels of
condensate per day east to Bruderheimand, Alberta. Condensate would be sourced from the global
market and used to dilute the bitumen enabling it to flow through the pipeline. “There will be a 25
meter wide right of way along the pipeline route and an additional 25 meter wide working space would
be reclaimed after construction. Ten electric powered pumping stations would be located along the
route with 4-hecatre fences around them” (Joint Review Panel, 18 December 2013). The Kitimat
Marine Terminal consists of two ship berths and storage for three condensate tanks and 16 oil storage
tanks. The terminal would also include a radar monitoring station and first response capabilities.
Between 225 and 250 super tankers, a year would primarily transport bitumen to the Canadian
terminal, and then ship crude back to the Asian markets. Currently, no existing crude oil tanker traffic
exists in the proposed waterways of the Northern Gateway. A voluntary moratorium keeps tankers
about 100 kilometers from shore. Enbridge’s responsibility for oil spills ends at the pipeline. If the
project receives final approval from the federal government by the end of June 2014, its expected
8
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completion is 2018.
In the case of the Northern Gateway, Enbridge intends to transport oil called bitumen, which
is a high-risk commodity with associated dangers. There is concern over the health risks of an oil spill
on land or water given the harm from exposure to the polycystic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHS)
contained in bitumen. PAHS is a known carcinogen that persists long after an oil spill has occurred.
Additionally, the condensate that Enbridge will transport to dilute the bitumen to enable it to flow
through the pipeline has associated risks. A spill of condensate releases a vapor that is toxic to humans
and wildlife (Carrier Sekani Tribal Council. 2011).
There are also concerns that the Northern Gateway will enable the expansion of the oil sands,
which will contribute to climate change. Alberta’s oil sands are said to hold the dirtiest oil in the world
because the oil creates three to five times more greenhouse gas emissions than conventional oil. The
creation of a pipeline to export Canada’s oil to new markets will enable the oil sands to grow and will
increase Canada’s emissions. In light of current global climate policies, the Northern Gateway will
take Canada in the wrong direction. Climate change and greenhouse gas emission impacts were
completely ignored during the Joint Review Panel, whereas the United States rejected the Keystone
pipeline in part because of the climate change issue (Cattaneo. 4 October 2013).
Regarding oil spills from the pipeline, Enbridge is responsible for $100 million in “ready cash”
that can be accessed within days of a large spill to help with cleanup, and $950 million in liability
coverage, as well as financing a heavy oil spill research program (Joint Review Panel, 2013). However,
even with these measures, a spill in remote areas of British Columbia could cost billions to clean up.
During the Joint Review Process, Enbridge was questioned about what would happen after insurance
runs out. “There was not a direct answer provided” (Vancouver Observer, 21 September 2012).
Canadian residents seem at risk of a heavy tax bill in the event of an oil spill from the Northern
Gateway (Coastal First Nations, March 24, 2013). In addition, these estimates do not take into account
“loss of ecological values, social problems associated with a spill, costs of strained community
relationships, losses related to homes, or uncertainties associated with the effects” (National Energy
Board, 2013).
As pipeline politics take center stage in North America, Enbridge has found itself in the middle
of a high profile controversy concerning human rights violations. The process of obtaining approval
for the Northern Gateway has violated the First Nations’ legal right to meaningful engagement and
consultation. The First Nations originally put forward an Aboriginal process framework that would
work in parallel to address their concerns, rights, and title. However, the proposed framework was
9
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rejected and a federally appointed process was chosen instead (CBC, 11 January 2011). Carrier Sekani
Tribal Council Vice Chief Terry Teegee asserted that the First Nations were not included in the
creation of the joint review agreement: “We wanted to review the terms of reference and have input
into it” (Williams, 2009, pg. 2). The Sea to Sands Conservation Alliance (2009) states that government
reviews are too narrow in scope. “Aboriginal rights are not sufficiently addressed, particularly their
right confirmed by the Constitution and the common law. Several local First Nations in our area
(Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, Takla First Nation and Nadleh Whut’en) …state that their Aboriginal
rights are being violated” (pg. 2). The Alliance asserts these groups have a right to FPIC with respect
to development in their territories and the Joint Review Panel does not have the legislation to address
their rights and to make decisions on their behalf.”
Enbridge became further entrenched in the controversy when the Federal Government
abdicated its duty to consult with the First Nations for Enbridge. The Joint Review Panel found that
“the company could have done more to clearly communicate to Aboriginal groups how it considered,
and would continue to consider, information provided by them” (Joint Review Panel, 18 December
2013). Enbridge did not incorporate much of the First Nations traditional land and marine knowledge
into their assessments. The First Nations were not provided with adequate resources to obtain unbiased
information, the necessary expertise to evaluate the information, or the means to participate in all of
the assessments and reviews.
McCreary and Mulligan (2014) note that the Enbridge project is the focus of international
controversy because, first, it would allow global marketing of the vast Canadian bitumen reserves
without passing through the United States. Second, leading climate scientists claim that this increase
in bitumen extraction will push humanity-caused drivers of climate change past tipping points.1 Within
this context, the focus of their paper is to examine the resistance of Indigenous peoples to the Northern
Gateway permitting process. “We are particularly motivated by a concern about the exclusion of
Carrier Sekani claims to jurisdiction over their territories from Canadian regulatory processes. If a
project will affect the traditional territories, reserve lands, or settlement areas of an Aboriginal group,
the National Energy Board (NEB) Filing Manual requires that proponents consider traditional land

1

K. Zickfeld, Greenhouse gas emission and climate impacts of the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline.
Written evidence submitted to the JRP for Living Oceans Society, Raincoast Conservation Foundation,
and ForestEthics.
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and resource use in their regulatory application” (pg. 116).2 To fulfill the requirements regarding the
Aboriginal traditional knowledge (ATK) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency,
“Enbridge has submitted detailed information on Aboriginal traditional land use, potential effects of
the proposed development, and plans for mitigation with its Northern Gateway application” (pg. 116).
The ATK process currently being used categorizes/considers indigenous authority based on its
current state (being) in the context of colonialism and the dispossession of native people. McCreary
and Mulligan (2014) state that the inclusion of ATK in the permitting process has been shown to add
concreteness to the concept of being an indigenous person in terms of both a knowable and a politically
constrained condition. Although this represents progress, they caution that “these politics of
recognition cannot fully contain the contingent processes of indigenous becoming” (pg. 125). Their
conclusions may be interpreted as suggesting that the current interpretation of indigenous being acts
as an impediment to moving forward and recognizing what indigenous status needs to become.
D. Accounting for Human and Indigenous Rights
The contention of the authors concerning two central issues at the heart of this research is as
follows. First, currently, indigenous rights violation risk and environmental risk are not stated
transparently in the accounting statements currently required by IASB rules. Thereby, investors are
extremely vulnerable to the associated costs that a business may incur. Second, both shareholders and
other stakeholders are entitled to have these risks reported on financial statements and within corporate
social responsibility reports. In the following discussion, we provide a limited overview of the
literature that starts with the most basic question of whether corporations should be required to
consider human rights in their decision making at all. We end where the state of accounting for human
rights currently stands and note possible approaches for improvements in the future.
In an essay in the New York Times, Milton Friedman (1970) states, “the sole responsibility of
business is to increase its profit” (quoted in Kruger, 2015). Hsieh states (2015, pg. 218), “we have
reason to reject assigning human rights obligations to business enterprises and their managers.” He
argues further that doing so risks undermining the human rights ideal that all members of society are
viewed as moral equals by the state and by one another. He is ultimately concerned that assigning
2

The manual indicates three circumstances requiring detailed information about traditional land and resource
use: 1) “The project would be located on, or traverse, Crown land or the traditional territory, reserve land
or settlement area of an Aboriginal group;” 2) “The project may adversely affect the current use of lands
and resources by Aboriginal people;” or 3) “There is outstanding concern about this element of the project,
which has not been resolved through consultation.” NEB, Filing Manual (Calgary: National Energy Board
Publications Office, 2004 [revised 2012]), pp. 4A-29.
11
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human rights obligations to companies is problematic for two reasons. First, in their role as economic
actors, treating all employees equally seems unduly demanding and incompatible with the
requirements of economic activity. Second, assigning human rights obligations to multinational
enterprises (MNEs) retreats from status egalitarianism because it limits the scope to which equal status
applies.
Hsieh uses an appropriately concrete example to distinguish the MNE’s responsibility for
respect, which is “to avoid infringing on the rights of others” (Ruggie, 2010) from the requirement to
promote others’ rights. His example is to consider “the right to an adequate education. Such a right is
normally understood as a claim right, meaning the rights bearer is entitled to press her claim to
education against those to whom the corresponding duty applies. … The right to education is a claim
right with respect to the state, but, with respect to MNEs, it is no longer a claim right but rather a
liberty right—a right against interference” (pg. 229).
On the opposite side of this issue, Chetty (2011) argues that Professor Ruggie’s report as the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on business and human rights, entitled Protect,
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights (2008), was his most important
work in that capacity. She further notes that this report “sets out a three-part policy framework of (1)
the state obligation to protect human rights against human rights abuses committed by corporate
actors; (2) the corporate responsibility to protect all human rights; and (3) the need for accessible and
effective grievance mechanisms (Ruggie framework)” (pg. 760). Frankental (2011) draws on Ruggie’s
mandate, which includes his fundamental assertion that all companies have a responsibility to respect
all human rights that they affect. Professor Ruggie’s (April 2008) “Report to Humans Rights Council”
states that globalization has led to corporate governance gaps that have permitted wrongful acts to be
committed by many types of companies without adequate sanctioning or reparation (cited in
Frankental (2011)). Frankental further notes that, “Professor Ruggie is right to draw attention to the
fundamental barriers that exist to holding companies accountable for their human right impacts, rooted
in complex international relations paradigms” (pg. 762).
McPhail and McKernan (2011) observe that business and human rights realization and abuse
have been firmly linked, which represents a significant development in corporate accountability. They
further note that the dominant and overt power relationships underlying the human rights discussion
have been the subject of extensive critical legal research, whereas these developments have received
very limited debate and analysis by both the critical accounting community and the accounting
profession. Gray and Gray (2011) cite Mary Robinson’s (former President of Ireland and former UN
12
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Commissioner for Human Rights) appeal in February 2009 for business schools to “take on the
challenge of human rights” (pp. 781–782).
Chetty (2011) comments on Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948,
which states, “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms
set forth in the Declaration can be fully realised”. She states that the “implications of Article 28 must
be that business should be held to account for human rights violations and furthermore must evolve
their practices to take place in a world order that promotes the realisation of human rights for
everybody” (pg. 761).
A relevant question for this research is as follows: for what human rights might MNEs be held
accountable, specifically as they apply to Indigenous peoples? Previously in section 2, we discussed
the right to FPIC specifically as it applies to Indigenous peoples’ rights regarding the Northern
Gateway project. The Boreal Leadership Council (BLC, 2012, pg. 3) notes that the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) reaffirmed FPIC and “broadened the principle
to include: a range of project development activities; the right to redress for lands, territories and
resources that had been adversely affected; and a commitment by the state to obtain free, prior and
informed consent of Indigenous peoples before approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources.” Canada has endorsed UNDRIP, but only considered it to be a “nonlegally-binding, aspirational document” (BLC, 2012, pg. 5). Federal policy currently recognizes FPIC,
but does not recognize Aboriginal rights requiring the consent of the community involved in the
development. Banerjee (2008) notes that marginalized stakeholders such as Indigenous peoples
receive more inadequate accountability information than more powerful stakeholders.
How should human rights be accounted for? Gray and Gray (2011) state that the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2008) is probably “the biggest source of insight into human rights
reporting…and has included a requirement to report on human rights for several years” (pg. 787).
However, they note that how accounting calculations and measurements can or should be used to
reflect human rights is unclear. They further note that an examination of human rights reporting offers
insight into how human rights are intertwined with environmental, water, and land rights issues. They
conclude that, “there is much to be done on matters of land rights as well as the accounting by and the
accounting of First Nations” (pg. 788).
Jones (2011) concludes that instead of aligning human rights and corporate behavior, the recent
expansion of corporate reports under the guise of corporate social responsibility has occurred largely
to enhance a positive corporate image. Sikka (2011, pg. 824) comments on how the United Nations
13
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Human Rights Council (2008, 2009) “seeks to connect CSR (corporate social responsibility) with
human rights and recommends that alongside their assessment of financial and business risks,
corporations should carry out a process of due diligence for their projects ‘whereby companies not
only ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view
to avoiding it…’” (UNHRC, 2008, paras. 25, 61).
Islam and McPhail (2011) examine the extent to which human rights language has entered the
corporate accountability discussion. They research the adoption of the International Labor
Organization’s (ILO) human rights standards by large multinational garment manufacturers sourcing
products from developing countries. They find an increasing number of disclosures since the ILO
Declaration’s confirmation and acceptance by the global community. Cooper, Coulson and Taylor
(2011) explain that an understanding of how universal human rights’ principles are translated into
everyday practice is an important challenge for human rights accounting.
Gallihofer, Haslam and van der Walt (2011, pg. 765) “link human rights to notions of
accountability and transparency (and hence to accounting) and elaborate how theoretical debates in
the humanities and social sciences refine but do not displace the argument that governance for human
rights is a meaningful pursuit and policy.” They cite Ratner (2001), who suggests that corporations
are more frequently seeing themselves as social-benefit providers where the state is unable or
unwilling to do so. They also question the role of the IASB in promoting accounting for human rights
and whether this effort should be quasi-law or mandated by states.
Gallihofer et al. (2011) note that, “Indigenous peoples are a good example of a marginalised
group…corporate regard for indigenous people has been poor and not kept up with the increased
awareness of their plight in the broader culture” (pg. 773). Neu (2000) sounds a very cautionary note
about accounting for Indigenous peoples. He is concerned that the practical effect of actually
accounting for Indigenous peoples has served to “translate neo-colonial policies into practice with the
consequences of reproductive and cultural genocide and ecocide” (Cited in Gallihofer et al., 2011, pg.
774).
On a practical level, Gallihofer et al. (2011) suggest that resource-rich states may be able to
alleviate human rights problems through spending programs, but there must be accurate accounting
for them. They further suggest that government accounts should reflect resources spent toward
addressing human rights issues. They note that, “if a state has many issues but does not spend even
what it can reasonably afford on relevant programmes to tackle the issues, that would tend to make
visible the State’s (effective) lack of concern about and complicity in people’s suffering.” They further
14
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comment that, “where corporations have directly financed programmes to tackle abuses this may be
disclosed through corporate accounts, potentially in reasonable and informative detail” (pg. 771–772).
Conversely, where corporations are complicit in, or actually commit, human rights abuses, there may
be accounting to make this visible. They cite the example of documented labor costs and timesheets
being used to determine whether sub-standard wages are being paid or whether labor practices are
unacceptable.
Gallihofer et al. (2011) proceed to question why the relevant, disaggregated accounting data
are not required to be disclosed under current IASB standards. They suggest that the answer from the
IASB’s perspective is both political self-preservation and practical since the requirement of disclosing
too much information may create competitive disadvantages. They continue (pg. 775): “In practice,
what factors are crucial vis-à-vis, for instance, PWYP (publish what you pay) concerns? It is unlikely
that economic costs are so crucial – given the possibilities of online reporting (Gallihofer et al., 2006)
and that many TNCs (transnational corporations) already have the disaggregated information for
internal control purposes. Additional audit cost should be minimal (Gallihofer and Haslam, 2007)”
(pg. 775). They further conclude that although accounting is subject to political pressures that conflict,
if significant global pressure can be put on TNCs, they will have to address this issue.
3. Hypotheses, Method of Analysis, and Data
The two competing hypotheses examined in this research are the economic insatiability
(profits at any cost) hypothesis versus the stakeholder activism (responsible concern) hypothesis.
The economic insatiability hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: If shareholders are motivated purely by corporations acting to earn profits
at any cost, announcements suggesting progress on the Northern Gateway project made
by Enbridge, or government statements supporting or promoting the project, should
generate significant positive market reaction.
Conversely, the stakeholder activism hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: If shareholders show responsible concern for the environment and the rights
of Indigenous peoples then announcements that suggest harmful impacts on either entity
attributable to the Northern Gateway project should generate significant negative market
reaction.
The types of tests we use in the analysis are described next. The implications that bear on the
15
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two hypotheses can then be properly drawn using direct reference to the representative variables.
The data sample of stakeholder activist events draws from major news sources starting in 2005,
shortly after Enbridge announced its intention to initiate the Northern Gateway project, and ending
in June 2013 to coincide with the end of the Joint Review Panel hearings.
First, a univariate comparison of means and medians of variables representing information
asymmetry, performance, and size compares Enbridge to a matched sample of 25 firms selected on
the basis of four- and three-digit SIC codes. The test conclusions are based on Wilcoxon- and t-tests
for significant differences in medians and means, respectively. The performance measures
employed are return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s q (TOBQ). The size
variables are average total assets (ASSETS) and market value of equity (MVEQ).
In this study, the variables used to proxy for information asymmetry are: 1) the bid–ask spread
(SPREAD), 2) the number of analysts who follow the company’s stock (NUMEST), and 3) the
standard deviation of the analyst’s estimates of earnings per share (STDEST). Data for the
NUMEST and STDEST variables were obtained from the IBES database for the month preceding
the announcement date. Previous studies utilizing these variables as proxies for information
asymmetry include, for example, Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Chung, McInish, Wood and
Wyhowski (1993), Coller and Yohn (1997), and Roulstone (2003).
If Enbridge exhibits significantly greater information asymmetry than its peers, an
implication is that investors will perceive the firm’s potential investment projects as embodying
greater and (possibly undisclosed) risk. The responsibly concerned stakeholders are expected to
view this negatively, whereas the profits-at-any-cost investors may favorably view this lack of
transparency as indicating unexploited future profit opportunities.
Second, an event study is employed to examine the market response to announcements and
press releases related to stakeholder activism. Announcements of events in which the First Nations
and their supporters, the government, environmentalists, Enbridge, the oil industry, and nongovernmental organizations actively opposed or supported the project were taken into account
through a time series analysis over eight years. Events are drawn from news sources and categorized
as First Nations Events, Environmental Events, Government Events, Company Events and Oil Spill
Events. Government Events were further broken down into Joint Review Panel, Federal, Provincial,
and Local Government Events. After the sample from 2005 to 2013 is collected and conflictingevent announcements are excluded, there are a total of 826 announcements of stakeholder activism
concerning indigenous rights violations and environmental concerns. The events are broken down
16
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as follows: 207 First Nations events, 137 Environmental Events, 372 Government Events, (252 JRP
events, 51 Provincial Events, 46 Federal Government Events, 23 Local Government Events), 61
Company Events, and 49 Oil Spill events.
Kruger (2015) and Elayan, Li, Liu, Meyer and Felton (2016) utilize an event-study approach
to examine investor reaction to positive and negative firm corporate social responsibility (CSR)
events. A similar research model is used to determine whether there are any economic consequences
from stakeholder activist events on Enbridge’s share price. Further, this analysis is used to examine
the share price reaction to the same types of events for a comparison group of other companies that
are either Enbridge’s business partners or associated with the pipeline project. The data are analyzed
for abnormal stock returns around announcement dates of stakeholder activist events related to the
Northern Gateway project using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to describe stock
returns. This model is effective because it uses more than one variable to describe stock returns and
factors that may affect the measurement of abnormal returns. Specifically, firm size and the
differential risk factors between firms with high versus low market-to-book equity ratio values are
simultaneously controlled. The market reaction to stakeholder activist events is determined by
computing the average abnormal return (AAR) on the basis of an ordinary least squares regression
using 150 daily returns from trading day t = –210 through trading day t = –61 relative to the
announcement date. The AAR for event date t is calculated as a simple cross-sectional average over
the number of firms in the sample. The event windows analyzed are for the three-day (t–1 to t+1)
and five-day (t–2 to t+2) cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). These event windows allow
us to capture the market’s reaction. To ensure that the results obtained are significant and that
conclusions can be drawn that stakeholder activist events are associated with abnormal returns, both
the rank z-test developed by Corrado (1989) and the Jackknife z-test developed by Giaccotto and
Sfiridis (1996) are used to test for the level of significance of the CAARs.
Finally, a cross-sectional regression model is used to examine the determinants of the
CAARs. The dependent variable is the three-day announcement period CAAR and the specific form
of the regression is as follows:
CAARt-1,t+1 = β0 + β1 (SPREAD) + β2 (NUMEST) + β3 (STDEST) + β4 (ROE) + β5 (SIZE)
+ β6 (TOBQ) + .

(1)

The three information asymmetry variables (SPREAD), (NUMEST), and (STDEST) are the same
as those used in the mean–median analysis. The ROE variable is used as the profitability measure,
SIZE is average total assets, and TOBQ is Tobin’s q (=market value of equity/book value of equity),
17
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which is meant to capture growth opportunities. These last three measures are included as control
variables in the regression and are examined in the mean–median analysis. Under the stakeholder
activism hypothesis, indications of greater information asymmetry (i.e., less transparent operations)
would be consistent with generating negative shareholder market reactions. If the economic
insatiability hypothesis is correct, less corporate transparency is not an issue. In fact, the case might
be made under this hypothesis that greater information asymmetry could be disguising potentially
lucrative investment opportunities and thereby engender a positive relationship with market returns.

4. Results
A. Mean–Median Comparison Between Enbridge and a Matching Industry Group
Table 1 shows the results of comparing several analyst and performance measures for
Enbridge versus a 25-firm industry sample group matched based on four-digit and three-digit SIC
codes from the COMPUSTAT database. The SPREAD (bid–ask variable) and STDEST (earnings
estimation error variable) for Enbridge are shown to be significantly higher than the comparison
group. Further, the NUMEST (analyst-following variable) is significantly lower for Enbridge, by
comparison. All of these consistent results show greater information asymmetry for Enbridge
relative to its peers. This evidence clearly supports the stakeholder activism hypothesis.
The fundamental performance measures for Enbridge in Table 1 are also significantly lower
than the comparison sample. The ROA and TOBQ measures, which represent earnings performance
and potential investment opportunities, respectively, are both significantly lower. Based on
ASSETS and MVEQ, Enbridge is significantly smaller than its peers. These results provide
evidence that Enbridge is less transparent, less profitable, and exhibits fewer growth opportunities
relative to similar companies.

Insert Table 1 about here.

B. Market Reaction to the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project as Perceived by Different
Stakeholders
Table 2 reports Enbridge’s comparative stock price reaction to announcements regarding
First Nations activism, environmentalist activism, Enbridge oil spills, government actions, and other
company announcements. Announcements that concern the First Nations and Enbridge’s oil spills
18
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generate the most significant reactions. The three-day and five-day CAARs for the First Nations are
–0.58% and –0.70% and are significant at the 0.10 level. Oil spill announcements generate
significant three-day and five-day CAARs of –1.06%, and –1.24%, respectively. Similarly,
environmentalist announcements generate significant CAARs of –0.42% (three-day) and –0.37%
(five-day). Significant evidence also exists that announcements by the British Columbia
government, which predominately reflect its opposition to the pipeline project proceeding, are also
associated with a negative Enbridge stock price reaction. Pointedly, Enbridge announcements that
promote or update the project’s progress do not engender a significant market reaction, although the
CAARs are negative. Taken together, these results show that Enbridge’s stock price is significantly
negatively impacted by activism from the First Nations and environmentalists, as well as its own oil
spill announcements. This evidence supports the stakeholder activism hypothesis and provides no
support for the economic insatiability hypothesis.

Insert Table 2 about here.

Table 3 reports the stock market reaction of companies generally associated with Enbridge,
such as banks, suppliers, or Northern Gateway project participants to announcements regarding the
First Nations activism, environmentalist activism, Enbridge oil spills, government actions, and
Enbridge project announcements. None of these CAAR results exhibit significance. Thus, there is
no impact on Enbridge’s business partners’ stock prices attributable to either positive or adverse
announcements about Enbridge. Apparently, market participants are sufficiently perceptive and are
able to disassociate Enbridge’s issues from the association or responsibility of its trading partners.

Insert Table 3 about here.

C. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
The results of regressing the three-day CAARs for Enbridge stock price reaction to
announcements regarding the First Nations and environmental activism, Enbridge oil spills, and
government and company announcements on firm-analyst and performance variables are shown in
Table 4. The regression model was previously stated in equation (1). The discussion on the three
control variables included in the model was also mentioned. Prior to selecting the control variables
employed, correlation analysis using Pearson correlation coefficients was conducted. In the interest
of brevity, the full tabular results are not included; however, the significant correlations are
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summarized briefly. The significant positive correlations are ROE vs. ROA and SIZE vs. NUMEST.
The significant negative correlations are ROE vs. NUMEST, SPREAD vs. TOBQ, and ROE vs.
SIZE. In an effort to avoid potential multi-collinearity issues and to examine the sensitivity of the
results to the model specification, five regression models are utilized. Model 1 is the complete model
presented in equation (1). The NUMEST variable is dropped from Model 2. Models 3, 4, and 5,
respectively, exclude SIZE, TOBQ, and ROE.
The SPREAD and STDEST parameter estimates are negative and significant in all five
regression models. The consistency of these results shows that the information asymmetry findings
are robust with regard to model specifications. These results support the stakeholder activism
hypothesis because the significant negative parameter estimates for both Enbridge’s bid–ask spread
and the analyst estimate errors in predicting Enbridge earnings per share are consistent with greater
information asymmetry. The ROE and TOBQ variables are significantly negatively related to
Enbridge’s price reaction in Models 1–3. In Models 1 and 2, the SIZE variable is negative and
marginally significant. These results suggest that adverse changes in both ROE (profitability) and
TOBQ (growth opportunities) are reflected in negative announcement period shareholder stock
price reactions.

Insert Table 4 about here.

D. Enbridge’s Annual Report Discussion of the Northern Gateway Project
The Appendix contains all of the verbiage associated with the discussion of the Northern
Gateway project from Enbridge’s 2013 Annual Report.3 Including headings, introductory sentences,
and others, the excerpt contains 1,660 words. Much of the discussion concerns the Joint Review
Panel’s findings, specifically 899 words. The only statement in which a financial cost is estimated
is on page 64 and is as follows: “Expenditures to date, which relate primarily to the regulatory
process, are approximately $0.4 billion, of which approximately half is being funded by potential
shippers on Northern Gateway. Given the many uncertainties surrounding Northern Gateway,
including final ownership structure, the potential financial impact of the project cannot be
determined at this time” (emphasis added). Thus, no estimate of the financial impact of the project

3

The last paragraph of the Appendix also provides the only mention of the Northern Gateway project in
Enbridge’s 2013 SEC-filed 10-K report. This statement consists of 138 words. Nowhere does it describe any
profits, costs, or risks specific to the project.
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on the company is provided in the annual report. One might observe that this is a clear illustration
of information asymmetry. Does Enbridge want shareholders to believe they did not engage in
extensive financial analysis of the project’s cost and benefits? Clearly, one would expect them to
have generated all types of pro-forma analysis of the project’s profitability under various scenarios,
including environmental and Indigenous peoples’ activism protesting the project. Apparently,
Enbridge does not feel the need, and obviously is not required, to provide relevant estimated
financial data for shareholders and other stakeholders that reveal the Northern Gateway project’s
expected costs, benefits, and impact on future firm performance.
Page 63 references Enbridge’s assessment of the potential risks of the project. The following
statement reflects the increased costs and risks attributable to environmental and geographic
situations. “A detailed estimate based on full engineering analysis of the pipeline route and terminal
location is currently being prepared. The detailed estimate will reflect a larger proportion of high
cost terrain, longer tunneling requirements and more extensive terminal site rock excavation than
provided for in the preliminary estimate, which is expected to result in a significant increase in the
cost estimate. The revised estimate is anticipated to be completed in the first quarter of 2014.”
Evidence of risk attributable to Indigenous peoples’ rights and environmentalists is also
presented on page 63. “Five applications for judicial review have been filed with the Federal Court
and the Federal Court of Appeal; three from Aboriginal groups and two from environmental groups.
The applications seek to set aside the findings of the JRP and prohibit the Federal Government from
taking any action to enable the project to proceed.”
The strategic and commercial risks stated on page 111 are as follows: “Public opinion may
be influenced by media attention directed to development projects such as Northern Gateway.
Potential impacts of a negative public opinion may include loss of business, legal action, increased
regulatory oversight and costs. Reputation risk often arises as a consequence of some other risk
event, such as in connection with operational, regulatory or legal risks. Therefore, reputation risk
cannot be managed in isolation from other risks.”
Aside from this discussion of risks, no costs or benefits are assigned or developed in either
Enbridge’s 2013 Annual Report or the SEC 10-K filing for the year ending December 31, 2013.
Then, these statements clearly do not engender any type of increased transparency that investors
can translate into the impact of the Northern Gateway project on the firm’s bottom line. Collectively,
this evidence fully supports the stakeholder activism hypothesis and is in complete agreement with
the evidence developed previously that supports this same hypothesis.
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5. Summary and Conclusions
Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway project serves as an ideal example of a major
corporate investment halted by stakeholder activism. Many of the objections raised by project
stakeholders stemmed from Enbridge being unclear, nonresponsive, or improperly communicative
about the project with the interested parties. This lack of transparency, or information asymmetry,
was clearly evident to Enbridge’s shareholders, the First Nations groups and environmental
organizations, and others who also perceived the potential risks. This concern was evidenced by the
outcry from all of these parties calling for the project’s abandonment.
Our study focuses on this disconnection of Enbridge’s projections of profitability and project
risk from the reality and uncertainties of the project’s completion and its impact on the environment.
We examine three measures representing information asymmetry, specifically Enbridge’s bid–ask
stock price spread, the number of analysts following Enbridge, and the standard deviation of these
analysts’ estimates of Enbridge’s earnings per share. Our mean–median tests provide consistent
evidence that Enbridge is viewed by the market as being less transparent in its business operations
compared with a sample of 25 peer firms. Using market reaction analysis, we find that Enbridge’s
stock price reacts significantly negatively to announcements about First Nations activism as well as
environmental activism. Additionally, we find that stakeholders are responsive to announcements
by the British Columbia government that do not support the project going forward. Our crosssectional regression analysis provides further significant support for all of the previous information
asymmetry results.
This study finds that the potential violation of indigenous rights and environmental concerns
for geological subsystems in Canada have significant economic consequences. The results show that
the market is paying attention to the First Nations and the environmental activism that highlights
indigenous rights violations and environmental concerns. Specifically, the market reacts negatively to
these First Nations and environmental announcements. Additionally, the market is paying attention to
announcements made about the Province of BC’s concerns about the Northern Gateway and reacts
negatively. Importantly, no significant reaction to Enbridge announcements about anything shows that
the market discounts these announcements about the Northern Gateway project. Therefore, most
company news is already anticipated and factored into the valuation of the company. The market is
aware of who holds the key to the Northern Gateway proceeding, and it is not the federal government
or the company. It is the First Nations and the other stakeholders, the Enbridge stockholders, and the
22
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Province of BC.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this are as follows: 1) There are economic
consequences associated with violating Indigenous rights and environmental concerns; 2) Investors
are concerned with Indigenous rights violations and projects that threaten the environment; 3)
Indigenous rights’ violation risk and environmental risk, particularly oil spill risk as it relates to the
impact on Indigenous peoples, are material and must be disclosed; and, 4) Businesses and
governments must engage the First Nations as major partners who have the right to free, prior, and
informed consent.
As a final point, a contention cited previously in this paper is that firms are not required by
the regulatory bodies to provide adequate details in their corporate reports. Given the previous
analysis of Enbridge, clearer accounting statements are necessary. Adequate detail would enable
both shareholders and stakeholders to assess appropriately the benefits, costs, and risks associated
with a firm’s potential investment projects. Assuming that Enbridge is meeting the minimum
requirement of the IASB standards, we have clearly shown that its statements referring to the
Northern Gateway disclose nothing of value to any stakeholder. Thus, accounting standards are
shown to be sorely lacking in appropriate disclosure requirements and must be expanded to disclose
potential investment profits, costs, and risks.
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Table 1: Mean-Median Comparison between Enbridge and a Matching Industry Group
SPREAD is the bid–ask spread measured as ((Ask Price–Bid Price)/((Bid Price+Ask Price)/2)), NUMEST is the average number of analysts
following the company, STDEST is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, ROE is return on equity measured as net income divided by market
value of equity, ROA is return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets, TOBQ is Tobin’s q, ASSETS is average total assets, and
MVEQ is market value of equity. Industry average was calculated on the basis of 25 companies matched to Enbridge Inc. using four- and threedigit SIC codes and total assets from the COMPUSTAT database. Data for NUMEST and STDEST were obtained from the IBES database for the
month preceding the announcement date. ***, **, and * designate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Difference represents the difference
in the mean and the median of each variable between Enbridge Inc. and its peers. We utilize the Wilcoxon test to test for the difference between
the medians, and the t-statistics to test for the difference between the means of each variable.

Variable
SPREAD
NUMEST
STDEST
ROE
ROA
TOBQ
ASSETS
MVEQ

Panel 1: Matching Firms Average
N
Mean Median
Std.
828
0.024
0.006
0.029
828
13.96
14.000
1.284
828
0.029
0.020
0.019
828
0.093
0.068
0.046
828
0.054
0.015
0.129
828
3.060
3.073
0.278
828
422.6
47172
11835
828
3053.6
34634
7810.5

N
828
828
828
828
828
828
828
828

Panel 2: Enbridge Inc.
Mean Median
Std.
0.102
0.112
0.051
12.56 13.235
1.173
0.162
0.134
0.056
0.089
0.075
0.023
0.025
0.021
0.005
1.808
1.721
0.257
41621 45237
4915.6
19817 20843.1
2039.1

Difference (2–1)
Mean
Median
0.078***
0.106***
–1.399*
–0.765
0.133***
0.114***
–0.004
0.007
–0.029***
0.006
–1.252**
–1.352**
–676.08
–1934.2**
–10714**
–13791.8**
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Table 2: Market Reaction to Announcements about the Northern Gateway Project Pipeline Categorized by Stakeholders Affected
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model over the period of the three-day (t–1 to t+1) (Panel
A) and five-day (t–2 to t+2) (Panel B) window periods. Announcements related to the Northern Gateway Project were categorized on the basis of the
relevant stakeholder group with a vested interest in the project or the group that might be most impacted. First Nations includes announcements related
to First Nations activism and their opposition on the grounds of human right violations. 2. Environment incorporates announcements that reflect the
Northern Gateway Project’s environmental risk and potential damage. 3. Oil Spill represents announcements of oil spills by Enbridge and their
implications for the likelihood of project success or failure. 4. Gov. Local includes announcements made by the Local Government in British Columbia,
which reflects their opposition and the implications of the project on their communities. 5. Gov. B.C. includes announcements made by the provincial
government of British Columbia, which mainly reflect their opposition and conditions of the project to proceed through the Province of British
Columbia. 6. Gov. Federal represents announcements made by the Canadian Federal Government mainly to promote the economic benefits of the
project and the likelihood of its success. 7. JRP reflects announcements made by the Joint Review Panel, which reflect their mandate and the progress
and obstacles associated with undertaking the project. 8. Enbridge Inc. includes announcements made by Enbridge Inc. to promote the project and its
values and to provide information that reflects the progress of the project. POS: NEG is the number of positive and negative abnormal returns in the
event window. CDA is the portfolio time series test statistic. RZ is the rank z-test statistic and JNZ is the Jackknife z-test statistic to test for significance
of the AAR and CAAR. ***, **, and * designate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.

Sample
Sub-Sample
1. First Nations
2. Environment
3. Oil Spill
4. Gov. Local
5. Gov. B.C.
6. Gov. Federal
7. JRP
8. Enbridge Co.
Aggregate

N
207
137
49
23
51
46
252
61
826

CAAR
–0.580
–0.420
–1.060
–0.450
–0.480
0.320
–0.110
–0.280
–0.383

Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the
Period t–1 to t+1
POS: NEG
CDA
RZ
JNZ
81:126***
–5.037***
–3.368*** –5.235***
63:74*
–3.039**
–2.000*
–3.383***
14:35***
–4.437***
–3.929*** –4.197***
7:16*
–1.239
–0.611
–2.476*
25:26
–1.887*
–1.628
–2.204*
30:16**
1.377
1.083
1.462
126:126
–1.201
0.250
–0.050
27:34
–1.301
–0.452
–0.626
373:453***
–2.439**
–1.819**
–2.089**

MAR
–0.70
–0.37
–1.24
–0.57
–0.77
–0.02
–0.10
–0.30
–0.509

Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the
Period t–2 to t+2
POS: NEG
CDA
RZ
JNZ
84:123** –4.667***
–3.215**
–4.757***
62:76*
–2.049**
–1.234*
–2.259**
16:33**
–4.011***
–3.462***
–4.229***
5:18**
–1.228
–0.752
–1.817*
21:30*
–2.354*
–2.032*
–2.179**
27:19
–0.073
–0.249
–0.013
130:122
–0.870
0.082
–0.930
27:34
–1.092
–1.018
–1.179
372:454*** –2.946*** –1.876**
–2.589***
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Table 3: Market Reaction to Companies associated with the Enbridge Project Pipeline as Perceived by Different Stakeholders
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model during the three-day (t–1 to t+1) (Panel A)
and five-day (t–2 to t+2) (Panel B) window periods. Announcements related to the Northern Gateway Project were categorized using the relevant
stakeholder group with a vested interest in the project or the group that might be most impacted. First Nations includes announcements related
to the First Nations activism and their opposition on the grounds of human right violations. 2. Environment incorporates announcements reflect
the Northern Gateway Project’s environmental risk and potential damage. 3. Oil Spill represents announcements of oil spills by Enbridge and
their implications for the likelihood of project success or failure. 4. Gov. Local includes announcements made by the local government in British
Columbia that reflect their opposition and the implications of the project on their communities. 5. Gov. B.C. includes announcements made by
the Provincial Government of British Columbia that mainly reflect their opposition and conditions if the project is to proceed through the Province
of British Columbia. 6. Gov. Federal represents announcements made by the Canadian Federal Government mainly to promote the economic
benefits of the project and the likelihood of its success. 7. JRP reflects announcements made by the Joint Review Panel that reflect their mandate
and the progress and obstacles associated with undertaking the project. 8. Enbridge Inc. includes announcements made by Enbridge Inc. to
promote the project and its values and to provide information that reflects the progress of the project. POS: NEG is the number of positive and
negative abnormal returns in the event window. CDA is the portfolio time series test statistic. RZ is the rank z-test statistic and JNZ is the
Jackknife z-test statistic to test for significance of the AAR and CAAR. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively, using a two-tail test.
Sample
Sub-Sample
1. First Nations
2. Environment
3. Oil Spill
4. Gov. Local
5. Gov. B.C.
6. Gov. Federal
7. JRP
8. Enbridge Co.

N
8474
6526
1933
1061
1863
2288
3963
2905

Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the
Period t–1 to t+1
CAR
POS: NEG
CDA
RZ
JNZ
–0.100
4003:4471
1.137
–1.375 –5.876
–0.050
3232:3294
–0.570
–0.768 –0.850
–0.210
887:1046
–2.519
–2.688 –2.846
–0.110
545:516
–0.432
–0.311 –1.635
0.210
920:943
1.570
0.517
0.584
–0.360 1013:1275
–2.825
–2.705
–7.103
0.050
1962:2001
0.518
0.310
0.061
–0.340 1343:1562
–2.582
–2.350
–5.452

MAR
–0.160
–0.070
–0.240
–0.140
0.270
–0.320
0.010
–0.430

Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the
Period t–2 to t+2
POS: NEG
CDA
RZ
3931:4543
1.354
–1.996
3172:3355
–0.639
–0.830
864:1069
–1.847
–2.547
516:545
–0.523
–0.311
938:925
1.561
0.854
1051:1237
–1.954
–1.887
1897:2069
0.061
–0.436
1297:1608
–2.509
–2.970

JNZ
–7.977
–3.053
–2.912
–1.731
0.244
–5.390
–2.136
-7.106
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
CAARt-1,t+1 = β0 + β1*(SPREAD) + β2*(NUMEST) + β3*(STDEST) + β4*(ROE) + β5*(SIZE) + β6*(TOBQ) + .
Results from estimating a cross-sectional regression model to explain the determinants of the CAAR where the dependent variable is the three-day
(t–1 through t+1) announcement period CAAR. The independent variables are: SPREAD is the bid–ask spread measured as ((Ask Price–Bid
Price)/((Bid Price+Ask Price)/2)). NUMEST is the average number of analysts following Enbridge. STDEST is the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts. ROE is return on equity measured as net income divided by market value of equity. TOBQ is Tobin’s q. Data for the number of analysts
following the company NUMEST and the standard deviation of analyst forecasts STDEST were obtained from the IBES database for the month
preceding the announcement date. P. Est. is the parameter estimate. T-Value is the t-test statistic from testing for parameter estimate significance.
***, **, and * designate the level of significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Variable
Intercept
SPREAD
STDEST
NUMEST
ROE
SIZE
TOBQ
F-Value
Adj. R. Sq.
N

Expected Sign
POS/NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
POS/NEG
POS/NEG
POS/NEG

P. Est.
0.152
–0.168
–0.069
–0.001
–0.128
–0.008
–0.015

Model 1
T-Value
2.400**
–3.900***
–2.020**
–1.280
–3.170***
–1.710*
–2.760***

4.320***
0.0235
828

P. Est.
0.140
–0.161
–0.072
na
–0.113
–0.008
–0.014

Model 2
T-Value
2.230**
–3.750***
–2.110**
na
–2.930***
–1.810*
–2.540**

4.850***
0.0228
828

P. Est.
0.049
–0.128
–0.078
–0.001
–0.071
na
–0.010

Model 3
T-Value
2.410**
–3.540***
–2.310**
–1.410
–3.080***
na
–2.160**

4.590***
0.0212
828

P. Est.
0.014
–0.063
–0.073
–0.000
–0.039
–0.001
na

Model 4
T-Value
0.360
–3.160***
–2.130**
–0.710
–1.600
–0.120
na

3.640***
0.0157
828

Model 5
P. Est.
T-Value
–0.035
–1.510
–0.070
–2.320**
–0.066
–1.920*
–0.000
–0.410
na
na
0.004
1.520
–0.001
–0.320
3.140***
0.0128
828
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Appendix
Enbridge Annual Report 2013: All references to the Northern Gateway project
Western Access
Our proposed Northern Gateway Project would transport 525,000 bpd of oil from Alberta for export to refineries in the Asia-Pacific
region and U.S. west coast. The project involves a crude oil export pipeline and condensate import pipeline between Bruderheim,
Alberta and a proposed new marine terminal in Kitimat, British Columbia. In December 2013, a federal Joint Review Panel
recommended the federal government approve the project, subject to 209 conditions. The Government of Canada is expected to
render its final decision on the Northern Gateway project by June 2014. (pg. 10)
In December 2013, following extensive review, the federal Joint Review Panel (JRP) recommended approval of the Northern
Gateway Project to the Canadian federal government, subject to 209 conditions. The JRP concluded Northern Gateway is in the
Canadian public interest and that it can be built and operated safely without significant adverse effects. While regulatory approval
is an important element, it’s just one step. We know more work needs to be done and we are focused on engaging Aboriginal
groups and other stakeholders to listen and address concerns. The government is expected to make a final decision by June 2014.
(pg. 29)

Growth Projects – Other Projects Under Development
The following projects have been announced by the Company, but have not yet met Enbridge’s criteria to be classified as
commercially secured. The Company also has significant additional attractive projects under development which have not yet
progressed to the point of public announcement. In its long-term funding plans, the Company makes full provision for all
commercially secured projects and makes provision for projects under development based on an assessment of the aggregate
securement success anticipated. Actual securement success achieved could exceed or fall short of the anticipated level. (pg. 62)

Liquids Pipelines
Northern Gateway Project
Northern Gateway involves constructing a twin 1,177-kilometre (731-mile) pipeline system from near Edmonton, Alberta to a new
marine terminal in Kitimat, British Columbia. One pipeline would transport crude oil for export from the Edmonton area to Kitimat
and is proposed to be a 36-inch diameter line with an initial capacity of 525,000 bpd. The other pipeline would be used to transport
imported condensate from Kitimat to the Edmonton area and is proposed to be a 20-inch diameter line with an initial capacity
of193,000 bpd. In 2010, Northern Gateway submitted an application to the NEB and the Joint Review Panel (JRP) was established
to review the proposed project, pursuant to the NEB Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. The JRP had a broad
mandate to assess the potential environmental effects of the project and to determine if development of Northern Gateway was in
the public interest. On December 19, 2013, the JRP issued its report on Northern Gateway. The report found that the petroleum
industry is a significant driver of the Canadian economy and an important contributor to the Canadian standard of living. The JRP
found that the potential economic effects of Northern Gateway on local, regional, and national economics would be positive and
would likely be significant. The JRP is also of the view that the Company’s commitments break new ground by providing an
unprecedented level of long-term economic, environmental, and social benefits to Aboriginal groups. It noted that the benefits of
Northern Gateway outweigh its burdens and that “Canadians would be better off with the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project than
without it.” The JRP found that Northern Gateway provided appropriate and effective opportunities for the public and potentially
affected parties to learn about the project and to provide their views and concerns to the Company. The JRP was satisfied that
Northern Gateway considered, and was responsive to, the input it received regarding the design, construction, and operation of
the project. The JRP found Northern Gateway applied a careful and precautionary approach to its environmental assessment and
that Northern Gateway had presented a level of engineering design information that met, or exceeded, regulatory requirements for
a thorough and comprehensive review in terms of whether or not it can construct and operate the project in a safe and responsible
manner that protects people and the environment. The JRP found that Northern Gateway followed good engineering practice in
determining a route that avoids or minimizes exposure to geo-hazards, had taken all reasonable steps to design a project that
would minimize risks of project malfunctions and accidents due to naturally occurring events and that mandatory and voluntary
measures outlined by the Company would reduce the potential for human error to the greatest extent possible. The JRP also
referenced the conclusions of the TERMPOL committee and the evidence of various expert witnesses appearing on behalf of
Northern Gateway and the Government of Canada in its assessment of the safety of marine transport and concluded that shipping
along the north coast of British Columbia could be accomplished safely the vast majority of the time even in the absence of many
of the mitigation measures that would be in place for Northern Gateway. These additional mitigation measures would include
reduced vessel speeds, escort tugs, redundant navigational systems and avoiding congestion in the narrower parts of the shipping
channels. The JRP noted Northern Gateway’s commitments represent a substantial increase in spill response capabilities beyond
those required by existing legislation and currently existing on the west coast of British Columbia, that they are based on
international best practice and continual advances in technology and spill response planning. The JRP included an appendix with
209 conditions that the JRP recommended be included in any certificate that was issued. The JRP recommended to the Governor
in Council that certificates of public convenience and necessity for the oil and condensate pipelines, incorporating the terms and
conditions in their report, be issued to Northern Gateway pursuant to Part III of the NEB Act. The Government of Canada will now
consult with Aboriginal groups on the JRP report and its recommendations prior to making a decision on whether to direct the NEB
to issue the certificates for the pipelines. Of the 45 Aboriginal groups eligible to participate as equity owners, 26 have signed up to
do so. The Governor in Council’s decision is expected in June 2014. The cost estimate included in the Northern Gateway filing with
the JRP reflects a preliminary estimate prepared in 2004 and escalated to 2010. A detailed estimate based on full engineering
analysis of the pipeline route and terminal location is currently being prepared. The detailed estimate will reflect a larger proportion
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of high cost terrain, longer tunneling requirements and more extensive terminal site rock excavation than provided for in the
preliminary estimate, which is expected to result in a significant increase in the cost estimate. The revised estimate is anticipated
to be completed in the first quarter of 2014.
Five applications for judicial review have been filed with the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal; three from Aboriginal
groups and two from environmental groups. The applications seek to set aside the findings of the JRP and prohibit the Federal
Government from taking any action to enable the project to proceed. (pg. 63)
Subject to continued commercial support, regulatory and other approvals and adequately addressing landowner and local
community concerns (including those of Aboriginal communities), the Company currently estimates that Northern Gateway could
be in service in 2018 at the earliest. The timing and outcome of judicial reviews could also impact the start of construction or other
project activities, which may lead to a delay in the start of operations beyond the current forecast. Expenditures to date, which
relate primarily to the regulatory process, are approximately $0.4 billion, of which approximately half is being funded by potential
shippers on Northern Gateway. Given the many uncertainties surrounding Northern Gateway, including final ownership structure,
the potential financial impact of the project cannot be determined at this time. The JRP posts public filings related to Northern
Gateway on its website at gatewaypanel.review-examen.gc.ca/clf-nsi/hm-eng.html and Northern Gateway also maintains a website
at northerngateway.ca where the full regulatory application submitted to the NEB, the 2010 Enbridge Northern Gateway Community
Social Responsibility Report and the December 19, 2013 Report of the JRP on the Northern Gateway Application are available.
None of the information contained on, or connected to, the JRPwebsite or the NorthernGateway website is incorporated
in or otherwise part of this MD&A. (pg. 64)

General Business Risks
Strategic and Commercial Risks
Public Opinion
Public opinion or reputation risk is the risk of negative impacts on the Company’s business, operations or financial condition
resulting from changes in the Company’s reputation with stakeholders, special interest groups, political leadership, the media or
other entities. Public opinion may be influenced by media attention directed to development projects such as Northern Gateway.
Potential impacts of a negative public opinion may include loss of business, legal action, increased regulatory oversight and costs.
Reputation risk often arises as a consequence of some other risk event, such as in connection with operational, regulatory or legal
risks. Therefore, reputation risk cannot be managed in isolation from other risks. The Company manages reputation risk by:
• having health, safety and environment management systems in place, as well as policies, programs and practices for conducting
safe and environmentally sound operations with an emphasis on the prevention of any incidents;
• having formal risk management policies, procedures and systems in place to identify, assess and mitigate risks to the Company;
(pg. 110) operating to the highest ethical standards, with integrity, honesty and transparency, and maintaining positive relationships
with customers, investors, employees, partners, regulators and other stakeholders;
• having strong corporate governance practices, including a Statement on Business Conduct, which requires all employees to
certify their compliance with Company policy on an annual basis, and whistleblower procedures, which allow employees to report
suspected ethical concerns on a confidential and anonymous basis; and
• pursuing socially responsible operations as a longer term corporate strategy (implemented through the Company’s CSR Policy,
Climate Change Policy, Aboriginal and Native American Policy and the Neutral Footprint Initiative). (pg. 111)

Enbridge Energy Partners – SEC 10-K Form Fiscal Year-end: December 31, 2013
All References to the Northern Gateway Project
Enbridge has filed an application with the NEB for construction of the Northern Gateway Pipeline, which includes both a
condensate import pipeline and a petroleum export pipeline. The condensate line would transport imported diluent from
Kitimat, British Columbia to the Edmonton, Alberta area. The petroleum export line would transport crude oil from the
Edmonton area to Kitimat and would compete with our Lakehead system for production from the Alberta Oil Sands. On
December 19, 2013, the National Energy Board’s Joint Review Panel released a recommendation to the Canadian Federal
Government to approve the project, subject to certain conditions. The Federal Government will render its final decision
by July 2014. Given the substantial growth in Western Canadian crude oil supply, this pipeline will provide another market
option for Canadian crude oil, an important consideration for Canadian crude oil producers. (pg. 12)
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